



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 30 November 2018

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center re-sources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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
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
Month at a Glance — November

The Indo-Pacific region experienced 90 IED events in November: 71 events in South Asia, 19 events in South East Asia, and zero events in Northeast Asia. These events consisted of 410 devices. There were 39 IED detonation events, 20 IED found and cleared events, one IED hoax event, and 30 IED cache events. There were 72 casualties in November: 10 civilians killed, 33 civilians wounded, three host nation forces killed, and 26 host nation forces wounded.

There were 90 IED events in the Indo-Pacific region in November 2018



Icons depict events for November 2018; heat map depicts event density from November 2017 - November 2018



This document is intended for those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.


November Executive Summary

SOUTH ASIA

IED events in November 2018 were 37% lower than events in November 2017 (71 events versus 114 events). Detonations typically represent the largest portion of events in South Asia. Device counts were over two and a half times higher in November 2018 than in November 2017 (387 devices recovered versus 143 devices).

The number of IED events in South Asia remained constant from October 2018 to November 2018 (73 events versus 71 events). IED events have been slightly elevated for the past two months due to elections in India's Chhattisgarh State. In Bangladesh, IED events decreased in November, following an uptick in violence in October related to militant groups. In India, where local elections have been occurring for the past two months, IED events increased in November to their highest level since May 2018. IED events in Nepal dropped to their lowest level of the year in November. Upcoming factors that may affect IED activity in South Asia include Bangladesh's parliamentary election on 30 DEC (see **Special Assessment**).

South Asia IED Events
November 2017 - November 2018




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	39	326	1	21	387
	Year	787	669	28	1918	3402
Event Count	Month	32	16	1	22	71
	Year	461	231	18	261	971

SOUTHEAST ASIA

IED events in November 2018 were slightly lower than events in November 2017 (19 events versus 25 events). IED events in Southeast Asia typically range between 20 and 30 events per month, with occasional outliers when large-scale coordinated attacks occur (such as the 63 IED events that occurred in May 2018 due to increased activity in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia). Device counts were over four times higher in November 2017 than in November 2018 (98 devices recovered versus 23 devices).

IED activity in November 2018 was slightly lower than October 2018 (19 events versus 20 events). In the Philippines, IED events dropped to their lowest level since December 2017. IED Events in Thailand remained low, though device counts were at the highest level since June 2018. In the coming month, the extension of martial law in the southern Philippines could impact IED activity. Attacks on places of worship during the holiday season have also occurred in previous years (such as the December 2000 church bombing in Indonesia).

Southeast Asia IED Events
November 2017 - November 2018



		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	10	6	0	7	23
	Year	185	139	7	575	906
Event Count	Month	7	4	0	8	19
	Year	158	76	8	126	368


NORTHEAST ASIA

There was no IED activity reported in November. It is probable that IED activity levels will remain low in the upcoming month.


IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

Return to first page


PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months



Past Year IED events by Country



Past Year Device Count by Country




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	49	332	1	28	410
	Year	975	808	35	2494	4312
Event Count	Month	39	20	1	30	90
	Year	622	307	26	389	1344


NOTE: The APCFC Monthly IED report includes both event counts (detonation, found/cleared, hoax, and cache) and device counts. It is important to note that a singular IED event may include multiple devices. For instance, a single IED cache event may contain several devices.

IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Device Highlight: IEDs Connected in Series

On 11 NOV, Maoists in India's Chhattisgarh State detonated seven IEDs in series, killing one Border Security Forces (BSF) member. Devices connected in series have become an increasingly common TTP used by Maoists throughout the Red Corridor and are commonly used against security force patrols. The first known instance of IEDs connected in series (sometimes referred to as "daisy-chained") was in August 2015, when local police found and cleared two sets of connected IEDs along a road and along a path in a forested area in Pulamu, Jharkhand. In this event, militants connected a set of 250 devices, each weighing 5-10kg, via detonation cord and emplaced the devices along a path that security forces could possibly employ during dismounted patrols. Fortunately, security forces noticed wires protruding from the ground and executed mitigation measures.



December 2016 — Cache of 100, 1kg-IEDs connected in series recovered in Latehar, Jharkhand

In total, there have been over 20 events in which IEDs connected in series were detonated, found and cleared, or recovered in caches since 2015. Typically, detonations of IEDs in series have not been particularly effective, though that may be changing; events in 2017 and 2018 are resulting in more casualties than those in 2015 and 2016. All of these events occurred in states plagued with Maoist activity, but many of them occurred in two specific, adjoining districts: Latehar and Palamu, suggesting that one cell of Maoists was developing and employing this TTP. Nonetheless, the most recent event on 11 NOV occurred over 700km away in Kanker district, which may indicate that other cells are now employing the same practice.

Maoist insurgents in India have shown themselves to be resilient and adaptable, and able to react to changing security measures with the adoption or development of new TTPs. IEDs connected in series are just one example of how Maoists have changed TTPs to target security forces using new techniques. At the time of the August 2015 events, security forces began to execute more dismounted patrols in forested areas and along footpaths, prompting Maoists to move away from planting roadside IEDs to connecting and emplacing multiple small IEDs in series that would kill or injure dismounts. Their ability to adapt to a changing security environment enables the Maoist to continue their violent activities, despite potential challenges to retaining personnel, maintaining territory, and funding issues.


Sources: YouTube (8/9/15) TOI (8/10/15) Deccan Herald (12/11/16) NDTV (11/11/18)

Special Assessment: Bangladesh Election Violence

On 30 DEC, Bangladesh will hold general elections for the *Jatiya Sangsad* (Bangladeshi Parliament). The ruling party, the Awami League (AL), currently dominates the parliament, holding approximately 79% of seats. The AL's leader, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed, has held office since 2009. Bangladesh's two primary political parties, the AL and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), control the political sphere, though many other political parties exist, as well. The AL and the BNP possess a historical animosity dating back to the 1971 Liberation War from Pakistan and this enmity has led to bouts of severe political violence over the years. Assassinations, attempted coups, IED use, bladed weapon attacks, and other forms of violence have occurred throughout the country, often instigated by political activists, rogue military members, or student organizations.

The last general election, which occurred on 5 JAN 2014, experienced low voter turn-out, boycotts by political parties, widespread violence (including the use of IEDs), nationwide *hartals* (mass protests used as a form of civil disobedience in South Asia), and *bandhs* (blockades of public services, such as transportation and businesses). In particular, members of the BNP (along with allies Jamaat-e-Islami (Jel) and Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS)), instigated violence in the streets starting in December 2013. For example, during a two-month period from December 2013 to January 2014, there were 559 IED events in Bangladesh, with the vast majority (507 events) being detonations. The events occurred nationwide, with high numbers in Dhaka, Khulna, and Rajshahi Divisions. Along with the targeting of opposing political groups, activists/militants targeted minorities (such as Ahmadi Muslims, Shia, Buddhists, and Hindus), often burning down their houses or vandalizing their businesses. Despite the high number of events, casualties remained relatively low, with approximately 140 total wounded or killed. These low casualty rates suggest that the devices were not particularly effective, and may have been used more to intimidate rivals and voters than to kill.

Following the conclusion of the 2014 election, IED violence declined to historical norms for several months. However, the rate of IED events again rose when BNP leaders called for protests on the one-year anniversary of the elections. From December 2014 to February 2015, there were 348 IED events, with a total of 311 killed or wounded. These figures do not include the widespread petrol bombing of the transportation sector (including buses and rickshaws) that wounded and killed dozens more. BNP and Jel/ICS perpetrated the majority of the violence once again, which would ultimately serve to fuel anti-BNP rhetoric by the AL in the four years following. The coordinated explosion of violence indicates that BNP and its allies had likely been planning the *hartal* over the previous year, allowing them to amass IEDs and petrol bombs throughout the country. Crude bombs, which are impact-detonated and incorporate black powder, were the most common devices used.



IED events during the 2013-2014 election cycle



January 2015—Bus bombing in Mirpur

Based on previous election and political violence, the Bangladeshi government has been proactively engaging with political and militant groups over the last couple of months to prevent elevated violence ahead of the 30 DEC election. Increased security operations targeting BNP and Jel/ICS activities led to the recovery of many IED caches in October and November. Security forces targeted activists' meetings, and though they reportedly recovered explosive materials on several occasions, critics of the AL-led government have claimed that the raids are politically motivated. BNP leadership claims that authorities detained over 500 activists in November alone, raising concerns that the elections will not be free and fair. Regardless of political motivation, a reduction in the number of explosive materials on the streets will likely prevent the widespread IED activity witnessed in 2014.

Special Assessment: Bangladesh Election Violence



January 2014—Police and soldiers stand near destroyed ballot boxes following an attack on a Bogra polling place

On a positive note, the BNP's agreement to participate in the election could also help stem some of the violence that occurred in 2014. The BNP's boycott of the 2014 elections led to increased IED activity, as activists attacked polling places, candidates, and opposing political groups. Initially, there were concerns that the BNP might boycott the 2018 election as well; however, they chose to participate in September – a decision that could lead to an overall reduction in election related violence. Despite this positive move, the elections will likely still be contentious, particularly because the BNP's leader, former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia is in prison, stemming from charges of corruption and the misuse of charity funds. On 28 NOV, Bangladesh's Attorney General stated that Zia would not be allowed to participate in the elections, resulting in BNP leaders submitting a formal protest.

Another factor that may impact the 30 DEC election is the changing threat landscape in Bangladesh. Since 2014, the threat from various Islamist militant organizations has evolved. For instance, the formation of ISIS-inspired Neo-JMB, its actions leading up to and during the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in 2016, and the resulting security backlash over the last two and a half years, have changed the way in which security forces address potential threats. Bangladesh's Rapid Action Battalion and special police units in metropolitan areas have proactively and aggressively identified and neutralized dozens of militants. Additionally, through a cycle of detaining and questioning militants, security forces have disrupted several cells that were amassing explosives and weapons.

Security forces' actions have prevented many attacks since March 2017, and most of the senior leaders of Neo-JMB have been killed or detained. However, despite these successes, JMB/Neo-JMB still pose a threat to the security of the government and ordinary citizens. Their development of suicide belts, homemade explosives (HME), and other more advanced TTPs, in addition to their use of cross-border smugglers and connections to JMB militants residing in India, demonstrates the continued relevance of JMB/Neo-JMB. It is possible that JMB/Neo-JMB or other Islamist militant organizations (such as Ansar al-Islam) will attempt to use any chaos or violence created by political parties to conduct attacks or acquire illicit arms, ammunition, and explosives.

Bangladesh is poised to prove that free and fair governance can coexist with traditional values and religion in South Asia. Ensuring that the 30 DEC election remains fair and supports the democratic process is key to showing the strength and value of the secular state. Likewise, protecting minority groups and ensuring the rights of all citizens can increase confidence in the rule of law and the valuable role that security forces play in protecting the country. The 30 DEC elections can serve as barometer for the positive changes made by Bangladesh to address its internal political and security concerns that erupted in previous years, as well as to show that democracy will thrive in the face of Islamist threats and political turmoil.



Crude bomb

Sources: NDTV (1/5/14) Daily Mail (1/18/15) Daily Sun (2/14/15) BDNews 24 (1/7/17) Prothom Alo (9/14/17) Crisis Group (2/28/18) Economic Times (7/13/18) VOA (9/17/18) Reuters (9/29/18) Dhaka Tribune (11/12/18) Dhaka Tribune (11/27/18) NDTV (11/28/18) Daily Star (12/1/18)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Jasimuddin Rahmani	
<p>ALIAS: Muhammad Jasimuddin Rahmani, Mufti Jasim Uddin Rahmani AFFILIATION: Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), Jihadist, pan-Islamist, Qutbist, Salafist, Sunni, takfiri ROLE: Spiritual Leader of the ABT, Leader of mosque in Dhaka STATUS: Currently in prison DOB: 1969 or 1970</p>	
<p>Jasimuddin Rahmani is the spiritual leader of Ansar al-Islam (a.k.a. Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT)), a banned terrorist organization in Bangladesh. Inspired by the teachings of the al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) radical cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, Rahmani began to propagate his own radical views in 2007 throughout Bangladesh via speeches, publications, and online communications.</p> <p>Operationally, Rahmani organized ABT members into small cells across Bangladesh. Early in 2008, these cells were primarily comprised of wealthy university students, and the group's ultimate objective was to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh through intimidation, radicalization, and violence.</p> <p>The government banned ABT, (re-named Ansar al-Islam or the Bangladesh branch of al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)) on 27 MAY 2015. Rahmani's influence by this time had caused the death of several bloggers, publishers, and "freethinkers." These killings all occurred in Bangladesh; however, Rahmani's message reached followers and helped self-radicalize citizens internationally. For example, Rahmani inspired the radicalization of Akayed Ullah, a Dhaka migrant to the United States, who on 11 DEC 2017 attempted to carry out a suicide bombing in a New York City Subway.</p> <p>Authorities detained Rahmani in Khajurtola on the outskirts of Barguna town on 12 AUG 2013. In the house with Rahmani were 30 members of ABT, who were reportedly plotting future attacks. Officials discovered in Rahmani's house a hit-list containing 12 names, including two ministers in the Awami League-led government, and bloggers Ahmed Rajib Haider and Asif Mohiuddin. On 31 DEC 2015, the court found Rahmani guilty of inciting the murder of blogger Rajib through his radical sermons and sentenced him to five years in prison. On 8 NOV 2016, authorities filed additional charges against Rahmani under Bangladesh's Anti-Terrorism Act for planning to take control of territory and to wage violent jihad in the country. Despite his incarceration, Rahmani remains an influential figure through the dissemination of his writings and online sermons.</p>	
<p>Sources: BDNews24 (8/27/13) Counter Extremism (2018) Washington Post (12/13/17) Eurasia Review (11/7/18) Daily Star (12/14/17)</p>	
VEO: West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB)	
<p>ALIAS: Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat (TPNPB) FOUNDED: 26 MAR 1973 LEADER: General Goliat Tabuni AREA: Central Highlands, Papua STRENGTH: 1,000 fighters</p>	
<p>Sporadic resistance to Indonesian rule in the remote region of Papua began in 1965. In the 1970s, some armed elements of this pro-independence movement in Papua, better known as the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM)), attempted to organize and turn these isolated acts of rebellion into a more coherent separatist struggle. On 1 JUL 1971, the group's organizers delivered their own constitution and a proclamation of independence for the Republic of West Papua. Two years later, the Republic of West Papua established their own army, the TPNPB.</p> <p>Following its establishment and until 2012, infighting among TPNPB leadership, driven by clan and personal interests, splintered the group into at least a dozen disparate armed factions (a theme that continues to plague both the armed and political resistance to this day). Throughout 2012, the TPNPB held a series of summits aimed at unification and which sought an agreement that accepts an overall military hierarchy and commander. On 5 MAY 2012, the summit attendees agreed to follow the leadership of Goliat Tabuni, bestowing him the rank of general and the title of Supreme Commander of the TPNPB. Although the summit was not completely successful at total group unification, many factions supported Tabuni.</p> <p>The TPNPB remains the most active and strongest armed faction in Papua, possessing an extensive operational reach. The level of effort the Indonesian government has levied to persuade the TPNPB to peace is a testament to Tabuni's prominence within the resistance movement and of the army he commands. Both the Yudhoyono and Jokowi administrations made various unsuccessful attempts to communicate with him, which usually involved money and other benefits as lures.</p> <p>In February 2018, the TPNPB released their Articles of War, which reasserted their declaration of war against the Indonesian government and dictated their legal basis for conflict. It also includes their demands, stipulations concerning protected personnel, who they consider legal targets, and more. The target list includes Indonesian police, military, government infrastructure, and foreign corporations operating in Papua. The ongoing conflict, characterized as a low intensity insurgency that features sporadic ambush-style attacks using relatively rudimentary weapons, has remained constant for decades and is unlikely to resolve in the near-term. Such attacks have occurred as recently as December 2018, when some 50 TPNPB militants killed 24 construction workers who were building a trans-Papua road.</p>	
<p>Sources: TPNPB News (6/2016) TPNPB News (2/2018) IPAC (8/24/15) Lowly Institute (4/18/18) Jakarta Post (12/6/18)</p>	



South Asia: November Significant Activity

Bangladesh

On 6 NOV, police killed Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) leader Khorshed Alam (aliases Salim and Master) in a gunfight in Shibganj, Bogura. Authorities suspect Alam was the mastermind behind the June murder of liberal blogger/writer Shahjahan Bachchu and the 2016 murder of Pir Shahidul. Police arrested him previously for using explosives and he served a 12-year sentence. His activities included acquiring firearms and funding for JMB. **Daily Star (11/7/18)**

On 8 NOV, Dhaka Metropolitan Police's Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) unit arrested eight Ansar al-Islam (formerly Ansarullah Bangla Team, ABT) members for spreading militant propaganda at a Rohingya refugee camp in Cox's Bazaar. The eight Ansar members were allegedly working under the guise of a banned Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) with links to a Pakistan-based relief organization that has connections to al-Qa'ida and Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT). **Daily Star (11/10/18)**

In mid-November, Bangladeshi CT officials claimed that ISIS-aligned Neo-JMB members are attempting to regroup to conduct attacks. The group, which security forces have severely degraded due to continuous pressure, has not successfully conducted any offensive attacks since the March 2017 Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) Camp suicide bombing. CT officials reportedly learned that Neo-JMB was regrouping following the arrest of eight Neo-JMB members in Dhaka on 11 NOV. Other Neo-JMB operatives detained in October also revealed plans for the group to conduct attacks. **Daily Star (11/14/18)**

On 20 NOV, a United States Congressman submitted a resolution to the U.S. House of Representatives over the threat posed by Islamist militant groups in Bangladesh. The congressional representative highlighted the actions of Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Chhatra Shibir, and Hefazat-e-Islam, and in particular the violence during the last election cycle in 2014 perpetrated by such organizations (**see Special Assessment**). The resolution further raised concern over the threat to democracy and democratic processes in Bangladesh posed by such organizations. **Daily Star (12/1/18)**

India

On 1 NOV, India's banned insurgency group, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) reportedly abducted and executed five ethnic Bengalis in India's northeast Assam state. The attack is likely in reaction to India's plan to grant citizenship to Bengali-speaking Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhist, and Christian minorities from neighboring countries, provided they arrived in India prior to 2015. Opponents of the bill suggest it discriminates against India's Muslims and violates India's constitution. India's ruling Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) is sponsoring the proposed amendment, ahead of India's Lok Sabha (Lower house of parliament) elections in Spring 2019. ULFA became active in 1979 and is estimated to have 3,000 to 4,000 active militants, whose singular goal is to create an independent socialist country of Assam. **al Jazeera (11/1/18)**

On 10 NOV, India's Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) announced it would soon receive deep ground penetrating radar technology, indigenously developed and produced by the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). Troops can use the devices to discover deeply buried IEDs and landmines. The CRPF Director reported that they would receive at least 12 of the devices for testing in the coming month. The initial models are hand-held and can cover small areas, increasing the protection of dismounted CRPF patrols; vehicle mounted radars will also be required to cover larger areas of rugged terrain in insurgent-prone areas. The CRPF currently relies on mine sweeping equipment and sniffer dogs to detect IEDs buried up to a foot deep; however, insurgents are burying IEDs much deeper which requires more sophisticated technology for detection. The number of IEDs planted by insurgents has nearly doubled with the onset of assembly elections in Maoist/Naxalite-populated regions in November 2018. **India Today (11/9/18)**

As of 11 NOV, there has been a 100% increase in the number of IEDs recovered in Chhattisgarh state in 2018 compared to 2013, when the state last held assembly elections. Chhattisgarh is in the "Red Corridor," so-called due to the preponderance of Maoist/Naxalite activity. IEDs are one of the primary TTPs used by Maoist/Naxalite insurgents, as they are cheap, easy to produce and conceal, and inflict greater casualties. Despite threats of violence to the voting public by Maoist insurgents and demands to boycott the elections this month, voter turnout was not significantly impacted, and registered as high as 76 percent on 12 and 20 NOV 2018 polling days. **The Hindu (11/11/18) Economic Times (11/21/18)**

South Asia: November Significant Activity

Facing a resurgent IED threat in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), security personnel have been increasing their training and planned use of equipment. Local police in J&K reported in November that they have sent a 14-member team to the Tamil Nadu Commando School for a four-month course to learn about IED disposal. Likewise, the CRPF reported that it plans to employ better night vision devices, small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), and thermal sights against the resurging IED threat. **The Economic Times (6/23/18) India Tribune (11/8/18)**

On 24 NOV, Gujarat police Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) arrested wanted Maoist militant, Rajesh Ravidas (alias Gopalji Prasad and Uttam Ji), from a factory in Bihar. Security forces believed that they killed Ravidas in a firefight in April 2017. Ravidas is reportedly part of the Maoist leadership in Bihar and Jharkhand States. Security forces have accused Ravidas of involvement in the 2016 IED blast that killed 10 CRPF troops in Aurangabad district. **Hindustan Times (11/24/18)**

India-Nepal

In November, an Indian news agency reported that an intelligence report claimed that LeT is establishing a presence in Nepal to plan and facilitate operations against India. Media reported that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was also using an NGO as a front organization for LeT/militant operations. The report claims that LeT operatives plan to exploit the open border between India and Nepal to facilitate operations. **DNA (11/4/18)**


Maldives

On 1 NOV, former President Mohamed Nasheed arrived in Malé after nearly three years in exile. Thousands of cheering supporters clad in yellow greeted him and President Solih in the streets. He served 13-year jail term for terrorism, which international rights groups and opposition politicians deemed politically motivated and illegal. Nasheed, who was the first democratically elected president of the Maldives, resigned (though many suspect he was forced to resign in a coup) in 2012. He is a staunch supporter of President Solih and has been a key leader in the Maldivian Democratic Party. **Maldives Independent (11/1/18)**

On 4 NOV, the Maldivian criminal court granted the conditional release of two suspects that authorities charged in November 2017 of planning to carry out suicide attacks on Malé in the name of ISIS. The judge in the case cited that treatment of the suspects while in custody and the state's failure to respond as reasons for their release. Similarly, in October, the court released two other suspects charged with terrorism in a separate bomb plot associated with ISIS on medical grounds. **Maldives Independent (11/4/18)**

On 5 NOV, the Maldives Police Service announced that they would review the investigations into the 2012 murder of prominent lawmaker Dr. Afrasheem Ali, the 2014 disappearance of journalist Ahmed Rilwan Abdulla, and the 2016 murder of liberal blogger/author Yameen Rasheed. Human rights advocates and family members of the three victims have alleged that the state may have sanctioned the disappearance of Rilwan and the murder of Rasheed to silence individuals that express dissenting opinions. **Mihaaru (11/5/18)**

Bangladesh: November IED Events



There were three IED detonation events and five IED cache events.

On 3 NOV, ICS activists detonated three crude bombs on the roof of their metropolitan office during a raid by police in Chandanpura, Chattogram. Police recovered an IED cache containing six crude bombs, 500g of gunpowder, two liters of petrol, glass shards, stones, and wood pieces. Police later accused 85 people of involvement in the activity, including high-ranking ICS members. **BD News 24 (11/4/18) Daily Star (11/5/18)**


On 8 NOV, police recovered an IED cache following a firefight with suspected drug dealers in Ujalpur, Chuadanga, Khulna. The cache contained four handmade bombs, one gun, two bullets, and a sack of Phensedyl. **New Age BD (11/8/18)**

On 9 NOV, police recovered an IED cache and detained three JMB suspects in Dinajpur, Rangpur. The cache contained IED components, one firearm, and ammunition. **Daily Star (11/9/18)**


IED activity dropped in November following a spike of activity in September and October. IED activity increased in the previous months (cache finds specifically) due to political violence and a resurgent JMB. With the approach of elections in December, Bangladeshi security forces have been on alert for possible violence from both legitimate political parties and militant groups. Past elections have shown upswings of violence related to elections (**see Special Assessment**). Taking a proactive stance, the Bangladeshi government has detained hundreds of people and conducted numerous raids, though critics of the measures claim they are primarily targeting the political opposition. Political violence could make the coming month tumultuous, testing the resolve and patience of both the government and the populace.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	8	0	0	16	24
	Year	83	11	0	276	370
Event Count	Month	3	0	0	5	8
	Year	39	5	0	61	105


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

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India: November IED Events



There were 29 IED detonation events, 15 IED found and cleared events, one hoax event, and 17 IED cache events.

On 8 NOV, an IED buried in a roadway detonated, destroying a bus that was transporting Indian security forces and civilian workers to their camp in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh. The detonation killed four civilians and one Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) member and injured two CISF personnel. Chhattisgarh has witnessed an increased number of Maoist attacks in response to assembly elections; this being the deadliest attack leading up to the first week of polling in November 2018. **The Express Tribune (11/8/18)**

On 13 NOV, security forces recovered an IED cache during an attempted smuggling operation from Pakistan at the Akhnoor border crossing, Jammu and Kashmir. The cache contained 12 detonators, 15 hand grenades, and an AK-56 rifle reportedly bearing Chinese markings with 234 rounds of ammunition. **NDTV (11/13/18)**


On 14 NOV, Maoists detonated an IED buried under a road in Bijapur Ghati, Bijapur, Chhattisgarh. The detonation injured four Border Security Force (BSF) personnel, one District Reserve Guard (DRG) soldier, and one civilian driver. **Hindustan Times (11/14/18)**

Overall IED and VEO activity continued to increase in November for the second straight month, likely due to elections in Chhattisgarh. Maoist/Naxalite elements saw the Chhattisgarh State elections as a target of opportunity; nonetheless, voting turnout was high (some 70 percent) and enthusiastic. Despite threats of violence for those who voted, calls for boycotts, and several hundred IEDs recovered prior to the polls opening, the polling proceeded smoothly. This was in large part due to the significant presence of Indian security forces, with some 100,000 uniformed personnel from several states and federal paramilitary forces providing polling security, route opening operations, and presence patrolling. The Indian Air Force also contributed by flying polling staffers to 217 polling stations.


In Jammu and Kashmir, security and police forces jointly conducted several raids, which resulted in finding IED caches and in firefights that caused the deaths of a number of militants, including eight sub-commanders of Hizb-ul Mujahideen and LeT in two raids on 23 and 29 NOV, and the notorious LeT commander, Naveed Jatt, on 28 NOV.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	31	325	1	5	362
	Year	539	539	5	1625	2708
Event Count	Month	29	15	1	17	62
	Year	289	118	5	183	595


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: November IED Events




There was one IED found and cleared events.

On 15 NOV, police found and cleared an IED from a busy intersection in Pushpalal, Nepalgunj, Banke, Bheri and detained one suspect. Police described the IED as a socket bomb concealed in a plastic bag. Police also recovered pamphlets from an underground group at the site. **Kathmandu Post (11/15/18) Kathmandu post (11/17/18)**


IED activity in November declined to its lowest level in the last year. Conspicuously absent following the spike of activity in August is Netra Bikram Chand's Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M), which was responsible for the overall increase in IED activity levels in 2017 and 2018. Notwithstanding the three-month lull in IED activity attributed to the CPN-M, the organization continued to disseminate anti-government messaging in November, to include staging a mass protest in Kathmandu on 25 NOV to mark the group's reorganization. CPN-M poses a significant threat to peace and stability throughout the country, as witnessed by the spike of violent activity attributed to the group during the 2017 elections.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	1	0	0	1
	Year	165	119	23	13	320
Event Count	Month	0	1	0	0	1
	Year	133	108	13	12	266


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

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Southeast Asia: November Significant Activity

Philippines

On 20 NOV, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited President Duterte in Manila for two days to broker 29 new agreements and to augment four existing projects in order to strengthen economic and military ties between the two countries. Some of the projects discussed were the building of a dam (at a cost of USD 232.5 million), the hiring of a consultancy for a rail plan, an inter-island bridge, a highway in Davao, and infrastructure projects. President Xi is the first Chinese President to visit the Philippines in 13 years, demonstrating the apparent desire for China to bolster this strategic relationship. Although projects and promises have failed in the past, China has expressed recent interest in increasing trade and investment with the Philippines, potentially under the guise of gaining an ally to support their conquests in the disputed islands in the South China Sea. It is uncertain at this time if the Philippines' relationship with China will affect their decades long ties with the United States.

REUTERS (11/19/18) NYTIMES (11/19/18)

President Duterte gave the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) the month of November to examine if a third extension of martial law was necessary. The PNP and AFP have expressed their positive endorsement of the extension past 31 DEC for one more year. Both organizations assessed that Mindanao locals supported further military rule due to continued threats of terrorism. **RAPPLER (12/3/18) GMANETWORK (12/3/18)**

Thailand

On 2 NOV, assailants shot and killed two volunteer rangers at a Yaring district marketplace, Pattani. The suspects disguised themselves as shoppers to conduct the attack. The suspects stole two rifles from deceased rangers. Stealing arms and ammunition is a common TTP of the southern insurgents. **Bangkok Post (11/3/18)**

On 16 NOV, the Thai government extended the state of emergency in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat until 19 JAN 19. In an effort to mitigate the ongoing insurgency, the state of emergency allows authorities to navigate around standard legal procedures to arrest and interrogate suspected insurgents. **Chiang Rai Times (11/17/18)**

On 25 NOV, three incidents of violence in the Deep South resulted in the deaths of two paramilitary rangers and two civilians, and left another ranger injured. In Thepha, Songkhla, at 1730 local, four attackers veiled in women's clothing shot and killed two rangers and an assistant village chief guarding the Tha Yee Market. The suspects fled on two motorcycles, stealing two M16 rifles and a 9mm pistol from the deceased. At 2010 local, assailants shot and killed a civilian in Sai Buri, Pattani. Around the same time, gunmen shot at paramilitary rangers near Ban Aipasay School in Rangae, Narathiwat; no injuries reported.

Authorities have observed insurgents in the Deep South dressing in women's clothing before. In 2013, authorities learned from local villagers that male insurgents dressed as Muslim women were attempting to place IEDs in several places in Pattani. During a coordinated, complex attack in May 2018, the suspected attackers dressed as women with scarves to hide their faces; the attack involved approximately 20 detonations targeting ATMs at various banks in several locations across Narathiwat, Yala, Songkhla, and Pattani. **Bangkok Post (11/26/18) Malay Mail (11/26/18)**

Burma

The Burmese and Bangladeshi governments have postponed plans for the repatriation of over a thousand Rohingya refugees until 2019 after officials discovered that the selected families refused to return to Burma. Bangladesh was to repatriate a total of 2,260 refugees (485 families) to Burma. More than 720,000 Rohingya fled Burma in August 2017 after the Burmese Army's (Tatmadaw) brutal response to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacks on police posts. The resultant violence killed approximately 10,000 people within months. The United Nations and many NGOs are also not supportive of repatriating the Rohingya at this time, as it could put the minority at an even greater risk. Burma does not recognize the Rohingya as Burmese citizens and calls them "Bengalis," referring to them as foreigners from Bangladesh. The Rohingya's reluctance to return stems from their fears of renewed violence and will only return if the government addresses their demands for justice, citizenship, and the ability to return their home villages and lands. **al Jazeera (11/22/18) The Irrawaddy (11/19/18) Strategy Page (11/15/18)**

On 13 NOV, over 500 internally displaced people fled Hsipaw, Shan State to seek refuge at a monastery due to the fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA). **BNI (11/15/18)**

Southeast Asia: November Significant Activity

On 23 NOV, during clashes between the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) and troops from the Northern Alliance, three civilians died. Clashes between ethnic armed organizations and the Tatmadaw are common occurrences in this region and these engagements often result in the inadvertent killing of civilians. **BNI (11/26/18)**


Malaysia

Between 30 OCT and 12 NOV, Malaysian Police arrested seven Filipinos in Sabah and a Malaysian in Putrajaya. Authorities suspected the Filipinos of having ties to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and that they entered Sabah via Sandakan illegally. Some of these Filipino suspects were working with ASG kidnapping for ransom cells, while authorities suspect others of involvement in recruiting. Officials detained the 38-year-old Malaysian man for channeling funds to the Syria-based, Malaysian ISIS militant Akel Zainal. **The Star (11/16/18)**

Indonesia

On 9 NOV, Indonesian Police foiled a knife attack on a North Jakarta police station by shooting a man who attacked a police officer with a machete and a butcher knife. The attack on the police station in Penjaringan took place in the early hours of Friday and left the officer with injuries to his hands. The antiterrorism squad was investigating possible links with VEOs, although another possibility is that the attacker suffered from severe depression and was looking to kill himself by provoking police to shoot him. The attacker, who allegedly shouted "Allah Akbar" as he attacked, had a lymphatic disease relapse and was unemployed. **EFE (11/9/18)**

Philippines: November IED Events



There were three IED detonation events, two IED found and cleared event, and eight IED cache events.

On 3 NOV, three members of Guerrilla Front 14, a faction of the New People's Army (NPA), turned in an IED and other materials to military officials in Dona Carmen, Tagbina, Suriago del Sur, Caraga, Mindanao. The turn-in contained one IED, one M653 rifle with one magazine loaded containing live ammunition, one .30 caliber M2 carbine, and one homemade 9mm Ingram. **MINDANAOTIMES (11/5/18)**


On 12 NOV, military forces recovered an IED cache after engaging in a brief firefight with members of the NPA in Igcabugao, Igbaras, Iloilo, Western Visayas, Panay. Military forces detained nine personnel. The cache contained one IED, ammunition, and three gallons of gasoline. **ABS (11/13/18)**

On 19 NOV, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) militants detonated two IEDs along a national highway in Datu Hofer Ampatuan, Maguindanao, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Mindanao. The second detonation occurred 30 minutes after the first while soldiers were conducting the post-blast investigation. The blast injured one soldier. In a similar incident, BIFF members detonated two IEDs along a national highway on 9 OCT targeting a military convoy in a comparable fashion, but there is no direction connection between the two incidents. **MSN (11/19/18)**


IED activity in November was significantly lower than October, with many events being caches in the southern Philippines perpetrated by the NPA and BIFF. The number of detonations decreased slightly; however, the amount of blast fishing-related events increased. The decline in IED events is likely due to continued security efforts by police and military forces, which includes advanced checkpoints, local citizens reporting suspicious activity to authorities, and routine patrols. Although the NPA had a lull in IED events for the month of November, it is likely that increased activity will occur during the month of December, as the Communist Party of the Philippines celebrates its 50th anniversary on 26 DEC.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	3	2	0	7	12
	Year	78	76	3	210	367
Event Count	Month	3	2	0	8	13
	Year	74	48	3	92	217


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: November IED Events



There were three IED detonation events.

On 17 NOV, an unknown number of ping-pong bombs exploded prematurely, injuring four civilians in Thong Pha Phum, Kanchanburi after a wild elephant watch team attempted to scare off a heard of elephants from damaging a plantation. The elephants charged the team's pick-up truck when one of the team members lit the fuse of one of the devices. He then accidentally dropped it into the bag of ping-pong bombs, causing a series of explosions. **Bangkok Post (11/18/18)**

On 22 NOV, a buried cooking gas cylinder IED detonated in Waeng, Narathiwat. The device detonated after a ranger pulled down a roadside banner. Militants had tied the device to a rope on the banner. Security forces discovered nine banners on the Sungai Kolok-Bukehta bypass in Ban To-or Village in Tambon Kayukla. The banners stated, "Patani Malays want independence" and "Independent Patani." **The Nation (11/22/18)**


On 26 NOV, insurgents detonated a 10kg gas cylinder RCIED hidden in a trash can near the road, targeting a ranger patrol unit in Ban Sen village, Yaha, Yala; one paramilitary ranger injured. **Malay Mail (11/26/18) The Nation (11/26/18) Bangkok Post (11/26/18)**

IED activity in Thailand increased slightly from one event in October to three in November. IED activity will likely remain low in the coming months. In November, there were two events involving cooking gas cylinder IEDs, making this the fifth time insurgents incorporated this type of container in 2018. This container type was a commonly used IED container by southern insurgents before authorities banned the use of steel cooking gas cylinders weighing 15kg or less in southern Thailand in January 2017.


A TTP is likely reemerging in the Deep South this year: insurgents dressing like women to disguise themselves while carrying out IED or SAF attacks (**see SEA SIGACTs**). On a number of occasions, authorities stationed at checkpoints have increased security measures following warnings that attackers may potentially conceal their identity by dressing as Muslim women riding motorcycles. By wearing women's clothing, insurgents are able to appear less threatening and can evade authorities when conducting attacks.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	6	0	0	0	6
	Year	64	23	1	57	145
Event Count	Month	3	0	0	0	3
	Year	55	16	1	10	82


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Burma: November IED Events



There was one IED detonation event and two IED found and cleared events.

On 11 NOV, an IED detonated in Muse, Shan killing one boy and injuring another while they played with the device. **The Irrawaddy (11/12/18)**

On 16 NOV, bomb squad officials blew-in-place three IEDs hidden in attaché cases after locals discovered them in front of the Central Market in Taunggyi Myoma Market, Shan State during the annual balloon festival. **Eleven (11/17/18) The Irrawaddy (11/16/18) TlangAu (11/16/18)**


On 28 NOV, authorities defused an IED after locals discovered it in a tailor shop at the Insein Market, Yangon. The device was a bottle filled with diesel and small pieces of nails connected by a wire to an outlet. **Coconuts Yangon (11/29/18)**

IED activity in Burma increased slightly this month from one event in October to four in November. The detonations that took place in Shan State involved devices likely related to the ongoing clashes between the Tatmadaw and EAOs in the region. It is often difficult to determine which party is responsible for planting IEDs and landmines, as each belligerent blames the other. Though the intended target is typically other combatants, civilians often become the victims.


The three IEDs concealed in attaché cases discovered in front of the Taunggyi Myoma is uncommon: attempts to foment chaos or terror at a public festival are not a typical occurrences in Burma. The 28 NOV event in Yangon was also unusual, as IED events do not commonly occur in the area. Based on the description of the device recovered at the tailor shop, it is possible the attacker was an inexperienced bomb maker, as several required components were missing. IED activity is expected to remain stable leading into the next month despite the ongoing clashes in northern Shan State.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	1	4	0	0	5
	Year	20	22	0	7	49
Event Count	Month	1	2	0	0	3
	Year	15	8	0	6	29


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

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Northeast Asia: November Significant Activity

China – Daily Life in Xinjiang

In NOV 2018, media reporting surfaced on forced civil-military riot drills conducted daily in Xinjiang Autonomous Region (XUAR), China. In August 2016, Chen Quanguo took over as the Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, following his “successes” in quelling Tibetan dissent. Chen immediately began to hold massive military parades, with Chinese soldiers screaming allegiance to the Communist Party and the state. Rigorous civilian battle drills, flag-raising ceremonies, and pervasive surveillance have recently replaced the parades. Chen has sought to militarize the region, requiring that shopkeepers, school children, and restaurant owners participate in daily battle drills. These drills consist of small groups of citizens rallying to a whistle blown by the group leader to quell riots that have not materialized since 2009. Chinese authorities insist there is a pernicious threat of extremism that will lead to terrorist acts and riots if not stamped out at its inception. The outcome of these intrusive drills is a disruptive business and living environment and a fearful society. Evidence of several thousand Uyghurs fighting in Syria and videos claiming a pending holy war against China serve as the government’s rationale for these exercises. **The Diplomat (11/12/18)**

China – Uyghur Jihadists in Syria

In NOV 2018, the predominantly Uyghur jihadist group in Syria, Katibat Ghuraba al Turkistan (KGT), released a video depicting training in Syria’s Latakia mountains. This video is propaganda for the Uyghur jihadists, whose numbers in Syria to range from hundreds to thousands. The KGT released a second video a few days later, in which group cadres trained with the Malhama Tactical Group. The Malhama Group is a jihadist organization of elite personnel from the Northern Caucasus and formed in 2016 from al-Qa’ida’s Syria-based group, the al-Nusra Front. The association of KGT with the well-known Malhama Group elevates KGT’s credibility as jihadists, and suggests that these Uyghur extremists are receiving advanced training. The Malhama Group leader, Abu Salman Belarussi, also tweeted and posted pictures of the joint training sessions. KGT formed in 2017 in northwestern Syria with mostly Uyghur fighters, but also contains several Arab and Palestinian personnel. KGT highlights its affiliation with al-Qa’ida in its propaganda videos, although the extent of this association is not clear. **The Long War Journal (11/5/18)**

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

On 23 NOV, three suicide bombers attacked the Chinese Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, killing four personnel. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility via social media. Consulate security forces stopped a vehicle that was laden with explosives from entering the compound, at which time the three attackers rushed the gate; one of them detonating a suicide vest. Security forces shot and killed the other two militants. A witness described the attackers lobbing a grenade first, then rushing forward with Kalashnikov rifles. The attack killed two civilians, as well as two policemen. The BLA, a Pakistani-based insurgent separatist group of some 2,000 – 3,000 militants, seeks the establishment of a separate nation for the Baloch ethnic group and disagrees with the perceived Chinese exploitation of local resources. The USD 62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative, which runs through Balochistan to the Pakistani port at Gwadar, and its 10,000 Chinese foreign workers, is a tangible example of the investment and development that China is conducting in Pakistan. In August 2018, the BLA claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a bus carrying Chinese mining engineers in southwest Pakistan near the Afghanistan and Iran borders. Pakistan accuses India of supporting the BLA and other Baloch rebel groups. In 2016, Pakistan intercepted an Indian who was attempting to meet with the BLA and who had already provided USD 40,000 to fund their attacks on CPEC projects and Chinese workers. **New York Times (11/23/18) The South China Morning Post (11/27/18)**

Japan-India

On 14 NOV 2018, India and Japan concluded a joint counter-terrorism exercise. Exercise DHARMA GUARDIAN took place in Mizoram, India and focused on joint counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism training and operations in semi-urban and urban environments. The two-week training took place near India’s Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School. A primary objective was to foster military and diplomatic ties between the two countries, as well as to exercise interoperability between the two forces. The armies began with familiarization on equipment, organizational structures, and planning, then graduated to joint tactical exercises to test interoperability and integrated unit command. Training included handling procedures for IEDs. **Daijworld (11/14/18) The Diplomat (11/15/18)**

INTERPOL-Republic of Korea

In NOV 2018, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) held elections for the presidency of the organization; a rotational seat that required filling after Chinese authorities arrested the Chinese president, Meng Hongwei, on corruption charges. After a contentious election, in which Russia attempted to persuade the 194-member states to vote for their candidate, a South Korean, Kim Jong-yang, emerged as the victor. Kim is a former police officer and Senior Vice President of INTERPOL, who had been serving as acting president after Meng disappeared in September following his return to Beijing. Kim will serve out the remaining two years of Meng’s term. Although the role of INTERPOL President is largely ceremonial compared to the role of Secretary-General, it is an influential position. Opponents of the Russian candidate raised concerns that the presidency could be used to pursue enemies of the Russian State. The Russian candidate, Alexander Prokopchuk, will remain as one of the four INTERPOL Vice Presidents, responsible for the oversight of Europe. **BBC (11/21/18)**

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
November 2018	28	29	30	31	1	2	3
	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
	18	19	20	21 NEP	22	23 PHL	24
	25	26 PHL	27	28	29	30	1
December 2018	2	3	4	5	6 IND	7	8
	9	10	11	12	13	14 IND	15
	16 BNG	17	18	19	20	21	22 IND
	23	24	25 IND	26	27	28	29
January 2019	30 BNG	31	1	2	3	4 BUR	5
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
	20 WW	21 WW	22 WW	23 WW	24 WW	25 WW	26 WW IND
	27 WW	28 WW	29 WW	30 WW	31 WW	1 WW	2 WW

IND – India
 PHL – Philippines
 BNG – Bangladesh
 BUR – Burma
 NEP – Nepal
 WW – Worldwide

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate	PN – Partner Nation
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil	PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	QRF – Quick Response Force
CIV – Civilian	RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
COIN – Counter-insurgency	RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
CWIED – Command Wire IED	SA – South Asia
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency	SAF – Small Arms Fire
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile	SEA – Southeast Asia
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal	SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
F/C – Found & Cleared	TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
HME – Homemade Explosives	TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C ₇ H ₅ N ₃ O ₆)
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)	TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
IDF – Indirect Fire	UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons	VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
IED – Improvised Explosive Device	VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom	VOIED – Victim Operated IED
KIA – Killed in Action	WIA – Wounded in Action
LOC – Line of Communication	
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas	
MSR – Main Supply Routes	
NFI – No Further Information	
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report	
PBA – Post Blast Analysis	
PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED	
PCB – Printed Circuit Board	

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group	JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani	KIA – Kachin Independence Army
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate	KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
BSF – Border Security Forces	KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
BNP – Bangladesh National Party	LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)	MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)	MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines	NPA – New People's Army
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)	PNP – Philippine National Police
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani	POLRI – Indonesian National Police
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
HNLC – Hynniewtre National Liberation Council (India)	RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh	RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
IB – India's Intelligence Bureau	SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
IM – Indian Mujahideen	SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
IrW – Irregular Warfare	ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)	UWSA – United Wa State Army
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham	YCL – Youth Communist League
JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid	
JI – Jemaah Islamiya	
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh	
JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed	